Pandering Judges

Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to theconcerns of the electorate and, as a result, potentially lacking in discipline butunlikely to pander to public opinion. We investigate this proposition empiricallyusing data on promotion decisions taken by senior English judges between 1985 and2005. Throughout this period the popular view was one of ill-disciplined elitism:senior judges were alleged to be favouring candidates from elite backgrounds overtheir equally capable non-elite counterparts. We find no evidence of such illdiscipline;most of the unconditional difference in promotion prospects between thetwo groups can simply be explained by differences in promotion-relevantcharacteristics. However, exploiting an unexpected proposal to remove control overpromotions from the judiciary, we do find evidence of pandering. When faced by theprospect of losing autonomy, senior judges began to favour non-elite candidates, aswell as candidates who were unconnected to members of the promotion committee.Our finding that tenured public officials can display both the upsides and downsidesof electoral accountability has implications for the literature on political agency, aswell as recent constitutional reforms.Electoral Accountability, Judges, Promotion Decisions

Un antilul·lista del segle XVIII: el Doctor Piquer i Arrufat (1711-1772)

Abstract not availabl

The returns to lobbying

Research by Mirko Draca and colleagues on Washington's 'revolving door' lobbyists gives an indication of the value of political connections in the UK.

Revolving Door Lobbyists

Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry- is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.Lobbying, revolving door, US Congress, political connections, political elites

In brief: 'Revolving door' lobbyists

Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen estimate the value of political connections in Washington

Un antilul·lista del segle XVIII:

Abstract not availabl